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Louisiana: Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House
David A. Szwak*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common view among commentators and practitioners that the insurance
contract "is so substantially infused with public policy concepts that it is impossible
to discuss the subject of insurance without a heavy dose of public policy
considerations."' Since insurance contracts, by their very nature, involve many
Louisiana citizens, "one finds the parameters of the bargaining arena between the
insurer and the insured sharply limited and carefully patrolled by regulatory
authorities."2 One such example is Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:3276(E) in
which the Louisiana Legislature has made a statement that every licensed private
contract security company "shall be required to have in effect general liability
insurance of at least five hundred thousand dollars." 3 This article will discuss
whether this statutory provision created by the Louisiana Legislature is a statement
of public policy and whether this statutory provision trumps assault and battery
exclusions in a licensed private contract security company's commercial general
liability policy. This article will discuss the pertinent jurisprudence on the subject
matter and will explain why assault and battery exclusions in a Louisiana licensed
private contract security company's general liability policy does not subvert the
statement in Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:3276 (E) and is binding and
enforceable.
A. The Assault and Battery Exclusion and What It Encompasses
In order to discuss the subject of this article thoroughly, it is necessary to
discuss exclusions in an insurance policy, specifically the assault and battery
exclusion. An insurer may contract with the insured as to the particular risks it will
not assume provided that neither public policy nor statutory provisions are
violated." Typically, these risks which are not assumed by the insurer are found in
the exclusion section of the policy. As one commentator has noted:
In the absence of contrary statutory provision, the insurer may include in
the policy any number of exceptions and limitations to which the insured
will agree, for insurance companies have the same right as individuals to
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Partner, Bodeneliner, Jones & Szwak, Shreveport, Louisiana.
1. William S. McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, Ill, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Insurance Law
and Practice §3 (1996).
2. Id.
3. La. R.S. 37:3276(E) (Supp. 2000).
4. Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d §22:30 (1997).
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limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please upon their
obligations, not inconsistent with public policy.5
One such area where insurance policies commonly exclude coverage is assault and
battery.
In Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp., the Louisiana Supreme Court
evaluated whether an insurance policy's assault and battery exclusion precluded
coverage for a rape.' The court was unimpressed with plaintiff's argument that
"rape" is a different crime from "assault" or "battery." 7 Plaintiff sought to suggest
an ambiguity existed, but the court determined:
[I]t is neither possible nor desirable for an insurance contract to
enumerate the various kinds and degrees of attacks encompassed by the
assault and battery exclusion. The clause need not mention rape or
strangulation or mayhem, or other greater or lesser invasions of the
person; all are subsumed in the broad language employed.'
The court found that "'assault' and 'battery' subsume all forms of tortious
menacing and unwanted touching."' The court also defined "battery" as involving
the "intentional use of force and/or violence upon the person of another."'"
Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the assault and battery
exclusion was very broad and excluded such conduct as rape.
Recently in Lawrence v. Security Professionals," the second circuit defined
"battery" as intentional offensive contact with another person.'2 The court went on
to further to define "intentional" as where the actor either consciously desired the
physical result of his act, or knows that the result is substantially certain to follow
his conduct."
B. The Jackson and Michelet Decisions Provided Sound Guidance for the
Interpretation of Assault and Battery Exclusions in Light of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 37:3276 (E)
In a 1995 decision, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Jackson v.
Rogers'4 upheld and enforced a commercial general liability policy issued to a
5. It
6. Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp.. 665 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1996).
7. Id. at 1170.
8. Id. (citations omitted).
9. id.
10. Id. at 1170-71. The court in Duplechain v. Tumer 444 So. 2d1322,1325 (La. App. 4thCir.
1984). writ denied. 448 So. 2d 114 (La. 1984), noted that. "[fln general, a person is criminally
responsible and civilly liable for the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.
Such actions constitute a battery."
11. 743 So. 2d 247 (l& App. 2d Cir. 1999), writ denied, No. 99-CC-2727, WL 1202368 (La.
Nov. 24, 1999).
12. Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987).
13. Bazley v. Tortonich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
14. 665 So. 2d 440 (La. App, I st Cir. 1995).
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private contract security company which contained an assault and battery exclusion.
In Jackson, the plaintiff, a dance hall patron, was involved in a physical altercation
wherein she sustained injuries and damages. 5 The plaintiff sued the private
security company that had been retained by the dance hall, the company's general
liability insurer and others. The security company's general liability insurer,
Northfield Insurance Company, moved for summary judgment, as its policy was
an occurrence policy which precluded coverage for damages or injuries arising
from assault and battery. The policy also excluded damages and injuries arising
out of the failure to prevent or suppress an assault and battery.
The Jackson court ruled that the assault and battery exclusion was "an
allowable limitation of liability and must be given effect."' The first circuit court
specifically found that the assault and battery exclusion "is not prohibited by public
policy or statute."' 7 The court disregarded plaintiff's attempt to artfully plead
negligence. The court stood firm in holding that, "[Tihere is a difference between
the versions relating to the mechanics of the tortfeasor's contact with Ms. Jackson,
but there is no issue of material fact."'8
The Jackson plaintiff argued that the policy was not in compliance with
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:3276 (E), which provides that a licensed private
contract security company must have in effect general liability insurance up to a
certain amount, because it contained the assault and battery exclusion which
precluded coverage for such conduct. Plaintiff argued for reformation of the
policy. The court rejected both arguments. The court found assault and battery
exclusions lawful and enforceable and found the "policy met all requirements of
La. R.S. 37:3276(E) and the Insurance Code."' 9 As noted by the Jackson court:
The first issue raised by the plaintiff concerns La. R.S. 37:3276(E), a
statutory provision which, at the time, required a private security business
to have in effect general liability insurance with limits of at least $25,000
which names the state as an additional insured. It further requires the
private security business to provide a certificate of insurance to the
Louisiana State Board of Private Security Examiners."
The court held that the insurance contract conformed to the legal mandate of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:3276 (E), notwithstanding the fact that the insurance
policy contained an assault and battery exclusion.
15. Id. at 441.
16. Id. at 444.
17. Jackson, 665 So. 2d at 444. "Ms. Jackson's injuries arose either from the altercation in which
Mr. Rogers was a part or from the suppression of a battery by Mr. Rogers. In either instance, liability
is excluded by the clear provisions of the policy." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at443.
20. Id. at 442.
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In 1996, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal decided Michelet v.
Scheuering Security Services,"' a similar case. In Michelet an apartment manager
sued a security guard, who had kidnaped and assaulted her, the security company,
who employed the guard, and the Louisiana State Board of Private Security. The
security company's insurer [insurer] was brought into the lawsuit. The trial court
granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding, inter alia, that the
assault and battery exclusion was enforceable and not against public policy.
Further, the court upheld an exclusion barring claims alleging damages arising from
the security company's alleged direct negligence in hiring and supervising its
guard. 2
2
In Michelet, the Louisiana State Board of Private Security argued that "the
licensees [guard companies and guards] are required to provide insurance and name
it [Louisiana State Board of Private Security] as an insured because the intent is
that the public have protection against a security service's negligent hiring and
intentional acts of a security guard."' The fourth circuit disagreed and held that
the arguments of the Louisiana State Board of Private Security had "no merit." The
Louisiana State Board of Private Security is charged with reviewing the qualifying
criteria and licensing guards. The court specifically stated that the Louisiana State
Board of Private Security "accepted the.., policy as [in] compliance under the
statute [La.R.S. 37:3270, et. seq.] and licensed SSS [guards]."2 The Louisiana
State Board of Private Security has not adopted any rule, regulation, interpretive
memo or other guidance with regard to what may constitute "general liability
insurance." It is clear that the Louisiana State Board of Private Security approved
the policies supplied by the insurers in Michelet and Jackson.
II. A NEw LINE OF CASES INTERPRETS THE ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXCLUSION
iN LIOHT OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 37:3276 (E)
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently upheld the right of insurers to limit
their contractual exposure through the assault and battery exclusion in Hickey v.
Centenary Oyster House.' The Louisiana Supreme Court likewise rejected the
intermediate appellate court's suggestion that Louisiana's Private Security
Regulatory and Licensing Law,' specifically Louisiana Revised Statutes
37:3276(E), created statutory liability through a general statement of public policy
in the Act.
21. 680 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied. 692 So. 2d 371, and writ denied, 692 So.
2d 372 (1996) (writs were denied with only Justices Calogero and Johnson agreeing to hear the case).
22. Michelet, 680 So. 2d at 148.
23. Id. at 149 (explanations added).
24. Id. (explanations added).
25. Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998).
26. See La. R.S. 37:3270-3298 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
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A. The Facts and Procedural History of Hickey v.Centenary Oyster House
Angela Hickey accompanied a group of friends to socialize and drink. Near
closing time at the Centenary Oyster House, Hickey and her friends were in a rear
parking lot about to leave when an armed robber approached the passenger-side of
the car. Hickey did not initially see the robber. As Hickey opened the driver's
door and began to step into the car to unlock the other doors, the car light
automatically illuminated and startled the robber. The robber turned slightly
towards Hickey, aimed and began firing at her through the passenger window. He
fired the gun five times, striking Hickey twice in the upper torso. The robber fled
on foot and has never been caught. This incident appeared to be a completely
random, criminal attack.
At the time of the incident, Colony Insurance Company provided insurance to
Melvin Ashley d/b/a Security Professionals, the company that provided security for
Centenary Oyster House. Centenary Oyster House had hired the security guard
service due to several criminal acts inside the premises and had stationed the guard
at the main entrance/exit with instructions to check identification cards as patrons
entered.
Hickey subsequently sued Centenary Oyster House, the security company, and
the security company's insurer, Colony Insurance Company.
Colony denied coverage for Melvin Ashley d/b/a Security Professionals.
Colony asserted that its "assault and battery" exclusions precluded coverage.
27
Melvin Ashley, the private security company that provided security for
Centenary Oyster House, suggested that James Nichols at Nichols Agency, an
insurance businessman Ashley used to secure liability insurance, misrepresented
facts in the course of obtaining the policy regarding coverage and that such
misrepresentation pertaining to coverage should have bound Colony Insurance
Company, the insurer that Nichols procured through McIntyre & Associates for
Ashley.s After the first hearing on the coverage motion, additional discovery was
taken. The additional discovery showed that Nichols obtained quotes, assisted in
completing applications and negotiated with general agents or insurers directly, but
as to Colony, Nichols had no authority to act on its behalf. McIntyre & Associates
27. The "Assault and Battery Exclusion" endorsement mad, as follows:
This Insurance does not apply to damages or expenses due to Bodily Injury. Property
Damage or Medical Expenses described in Section L coverage A. and C. arising from:
i. Assault and Battery committed by any insured, any employee of any insured, or any other
person, whether or not committed by or at the direction of any insured.
2. The failure to suppress or prevent assault or battery by any person in (A) above,
3. The failure to provide an environment safe from Assault and Battery or failure to warn
of the dangers of the environment which could contribute to assault and battery,
4. The negligent hiring, supervision or training of an employee of the insured in A) above,
5. The use of reasonable force to protect persons or property intended from the standpoint
of the Insured or at the direction of the Insured.
(emphasis added).
28. See generally Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House. 690 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
rev'd on other grounds, 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998).
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was Colony's general agent and only McIntyre & Associates had authority to bind
Colony. Nichols had no authority to bind Colony or McIntyre & Associates or to
issue coverage or any insurance. Nichols had no contract or other relationship with
Colony. Nichols had no direct communications with Colony." It was determined
that Nichols Agency did not bind Colony through its coverage representations
because an agency relationship did not exist.
Colony filed a motion for summary judgment requesting a dismissal for lack
of coverage. Trial Judge Emanuel, in the first hearing on the motion, expressed a
desire to defer ruling on the coverage motion pending a ruling from the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp.,30 a case involving similar
assault and battery claims and a similar insurance policy exclusions.3 1
I. A Look at Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp., a Prior Case
In Ledbetterv. Concord General Corp. ,32 the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
the "assault and battery" exclusion in a motel's commercial general liability (CGL)
insurance policy. In Ledbetter, plaintiff was asleep in her motel room when an
intruder made an unauthorized entry and raped her. The rapist then attempted to
kidnap the plaintiff. Plaintiff leapt from the rapist's moving vehicle and sustained
additional injuries. The insurer who provided CGL coverage to the motel moved
for summary judgment based upon their "assault and battery" exclusions. The trial
court denied the motion. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed,
in part, and remanded. The second motion for summaryjudgment, based upon the
same exclusions, which are similar to the exclusions in Hickey, was denied by the
trial judge. Writs were granted and the second circuit reversed the trial judge and
granted the motion, thereby dismissing claims against the insurer. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in Ledbetter, vacated the second circuit's ruling and remanded. On
remand, the trial judge enteredjudgment against the owners of the motel and found
coverage under the CGL policy. Both parties appealed. The second circuit
reversed the judgment against the insurer but affirmed the judgment in other
respects. Writ of certiorari was granted by the supreme court on the coverage
issue. In its 1996 opinion, the supreme court found that the insurance policy was
clear and expressed the intent of the parties. The court enforced the assault and
battery exclusions. There was no coverage for the rape and battery-related injuries.
29. The intermediate appellate court in Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 690 So. 2d 858. 862
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1997). rev'd on other grounds. 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998), correctly rejected
plaintiff's attempts to paint Nichols as Colony's agent. The appellate opinion contains a good
discussion of Louisiana law regarding insurance brokers as opposed to general agents.
30. 665So. 2d 1166(La. 1996).
31. Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 719 So. 2d 421,423 n.2 (l.a. 1998), quoted the Ledbetter
policy's assault and battery exclusion:
Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, it is understood and agreed that
this policy excludes claims arising out of Assault and Battery, whether caused by or at the
instigation of, the insured, his employees, patrons, or any causes whatsoever.
32. 665 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1996).
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a. The Clear Language of the Policy Controls
In Ledbetter, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "the rule of strict
construction does 'not authorize a perversion of language, or the exercise of
inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists.""'
The Ledbetter court, like lower appellate courts in Louisiana, ruled that when
language in a policy and its endorsements is clear and unambiguous, a reasonable
interpretation consistent with the obvious meaning and intent of the policy must be
given and perversion of the language should not be attempted.' The court noted
that, "[I]nsurance companies have the right to limit coverage in any manner they
desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public
policy."'" Provisions in an insurance contract must be given effect as they
constitute the entire basis for any responsibility or liability between the insured and
insurer. 3
B. Subsequent Procedural History of Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House After
the Louisiana Supreme Court Decision in Ledbetter v. Concord
General Corp.
After the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling in Ledbetter v. Concord General
Corp,.3 Colony reset its motion and a second hearing was held before Trial Judge
Emanuel in Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House. Trial Judge Emanuel granted the
motion and dismissed Colony from the suit, with prejudice. The evidence proved
to Trial Judge Emanuel's satisfaction that Nichols Agency was a mere broker of
insurance. Trial Judge Emanuel was also satisfied that Colony's policy did not
afford coverage for Hickey's claims and damages. He found Colony's assault and
battery exclusions applicable and enforceable. He stated that Colony's policy was
lawful and not against public policy. 8 After all, Colony's insurance policy and its
provisions were accepted by the Insurance Commissioner of Louisiana and the
Louisiana State Board of Private Security, who was made an additional insured
33. Id. at 1169.
34. Ledbetter, 665 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1996); See also Maggio v. Manchester Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d
255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Western Preferred Cas. Co.. 424 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1982), writ denied. 427 So. 2d 1212 (La. 1983).
35. Ledbetter, 665 So. 2d at 1169 (quoting Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 634 So. 2d 1180,
1183 (La. 1994).
36. Gonsalves v. Dixon, 487 So. 2d 644, 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Western
Preferted Cas. Co., 424 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 1212 (La. 1983).
37. 665 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1996).
38. "Public policy" has been generally defined as:
[Clommunity common sense and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the
state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare, and the like; it is that general and
well-settled public opinion relating to a man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having
due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation and situation.
Black's Law Dictionary 1231 (6th ed. 1990). citing Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F.Supp.
793,796 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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on the policy as required by law and who received a certified copy of the policy
when it was first issued to Ashley and then subsequently renewed Ashley's
licensing on other occasions.
The trial judge granted Colony summary judgment, dismissing the case.
Hickey appealed to the second circuit court of appeal. The second circuit reversed
the trial judge and Colony made application for writs to the Louisiana Supreme
Court.39 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted Colony's application pursuant to
the supervisory jurisdiction of that Court.4 ' The Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the second circuit, finding that it erred in reversing the summaryjudgment. The second circuit had squarely rejected and held contrary to other
sound decisions of the first and fourth circuits, in Jackson v. Rogers"' and Michelet
v. Scheuering Security Services."2
C. A Look at Matthews v. City of Shreveport
In a second, independent case, which was unfolding at the same time as
Hickey, the second circuit, in Matthews v. City of Shreveport.' reversed another
summary judgment dismissal in favor of Colony Insurance Company based upon
the same assault and battery exclusions. In a rather bizarre twist, the Matthews
case involved the same exact issues, same appealing and responding parties, same
insured, same insurance policy, same insurance policy exclusions, same counsels
of record, and the same trial judge as in the Hickey case.' Both cases were
essentially rendered in the trial and appellate levels at the same time. On page three
of the unreported Matthews opinion, the second circuit acknowledged that its
Ifickey opinion, rendered days earlier by a different panel, and its Matthews
opinion were in direct conflict with Jackson v. Rogers and Michelet v. Scheuering
Security Services."5
In Mathews, the plaintiffs [the Matthews family] attended a semi-professional
football game at a stadium owned and operated by the city of Shreveport. Security
for the event Was provided, under contract, by Melvin Ashley d/b/a Security
Professionals. At the game, a group of rowdy, drunken men shouted profanities
39. The Second Circuit's decision in Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 690 So. 2d 858 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1997). rev'd, 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998), reversed the summary judgment dismissal of
Colony Insurance Company entered by trial Judge Emanuel.
40. See R. La. Sup. Ct. 10(5)(b).
41. 665 So. 2d 440 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995).
42. 680 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 692 So. 2d 371, and writ denied. 692 So.
2d 372 (1996).
43. 693 So. 2d 16 (unreported) (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997). writs granted. 731 So. 2d 272 (1998),
rev'don remand, 726 So. 2d 1059 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1999).
44. Interestingly, there has now been a third decision, Lawrence v. Security Professionals. 743So. 2d 247 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999), writ denied, No. 99-CC-2727, WL 1202368 (La. Nov. 24, 1999).involving the same insured, same policy, and similar facts. Trial court denied summary judgment based
on assault and battery exclusions. The second circuit granted writs but affirmed the decision, finding
genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment dismissing Colony.
45. Jackson, 665 So. 2d at 440; Michelet. 680 So. 2d at 140,
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and insults, which were mainly ,directed at the Pelican Cheerleaders, as well as
other spectators and one female security guard. One of the plaintiffs' approached
the men intending "to put an end to the mob's threatening behavior."4 A mel~e
broke out and two of the plaintiffs were beaten and the others allegedly incurred
mental injuries from witnessing the beatings.
At the time of the alleged injuries to plaintiffs, Colony Insurance Company
provided insurance to Melvin Ashley d/b/a Security Professionals. The
aforementioned and listed "assault and battery" exclusions were'contained in the
policy. Colony filed its motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue.' As
in Hickey," plaintiffs attempted to argue that Nichols Agency 9 was an agent of
Colony. As in Hickey, Trial Judge Emanuel found that Nichols Agency was not
Colony's agent. Again, as in Hickey, the trial judge found Colony's policy and
assault and battery exclusions enforceable and applicable, thereby relieving Colony
of coverage for plaintiffs' alleged damages. The trial judge again found Ledbetter
v. Concord General Corp.," dispositive on the assault and battery exclusions.
The second circuit,"' as in Hickey, reversed the trial judge. The court
acknowledged that its recent Hickey and Matthews decisions directly conflicted
with other Louisiana case law. Since the appellate circuits were now in conflict,
the supreme court granted writs.
D. The Louisiana Supreme Court Reverses the Second Circuit Decision in
Hickey
The Louisiana Supreme Court issued a written ruling reversing the second
circuit's decision in the Hickey case.52 The court found that the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal erred in ruling that Colony Insurance Company's general
liability insurance policy, including the "assault and battery" exclusions, issued to
Melvin Ashley d/b/a Security Professionals, was against the public policy"3 stated
in the purpose of the Private Security Regulatory and Licensing Law' and contrary
to the general liability insurance provision in Louisiana Revised Statutes
46. Petition, Para.28.
47. Suit No. 402,202-F, 1st Jud. Dist. C., Caddo Parish, La.
48. 690 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998).
49. Nichols Agency was the insurance broker for Melvin Ashley d/b/a Security Professionals.
50. 665 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1996).
51. Matthews v. City of Shreveport, No. 9629396-CA, 693 So. 2d 16(unreported), writ granted,
731 So. 2d 272 (1998), rev'don remand, 726 So. 2d 1059 (La. 1999).
52. 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998).
53. See La. R.S. 37:3270 (A) and (B) (1988 & Supp. 1999). Section (A) provides that:
(A) The Legislature of Louisiana declares that it is necessary to require the licensure of
private security agents and businesses to be in the best interest of the citizens of this state.
(I) The purpose of this Chapter is to require qualifying criteria in a professional field
in which unqualified individuals may injure the public. The requirements of this
Chapter will contribute to the safety, health, and welfare of the people of Louisiana."
(emphasis added).
54. La. R.S. 37:3270-3298 (1988 & Supp. 1999).
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37:3276(E).s The court rejected the second circuit's decisions and upheld the first
and fourth circuits' decisions in Jackson v. Rogers," and Michelet v. Scheuering
Security Services, respectively. 7 The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the court
of appeal's opinion in Hickey which allowed coverage of all claims "if the-insured
[guard company or guard] causes, partly or wholly, the injury to the person." The
Louisiana Supreme Court likewise rejected the second circuit ruling "that no
exclusion or qualification of coverage will be enforced if it is based upon the
cause[s] of the contemplated injury."
The supreme court found that "general liability insurance," as required in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:3276(E), placed an obligation on the security guard
company, not the insurer, to obtain general liability insurance, as specified in the
statute, and the statute did not call for unrestricted insurance and may exclude
actions and damages resulting from assault and battery and the like. The court
found it unnecessary to address the various constitutional attacks levied by Colony
in response to the second circuit's interpretation. The court rejected the second
circuit's idea that the general public policy statement found in the Private Security
Regulatory and Licensing Law5 created statutory liability for insurers to cover
claims for assaults and batteries.5
9
The Private Security Regulatory and Licensing Law'c has a stated public policy
of protecting the public from unqualified security agents [guards]. It is a regulatory
Act providing "detailed rules regarding training, uniforms, and license fees and
renewals. Overall, the Act is a detailed licensing scheme for the profession of
private security agents.'' In this case, the insured's guards were all licensed and
trained by the State Board of Private Security, the governing Board mandated by
the Private Security Regulatory and Licensing Law.' The security company was
properly licensed and had obtained general liability insurance in the required limits
and named the State Board as an additional insured, as required by Louisiana
55. Hlckey. 719 So. 2d at 424-26. At the time of the incident made subject of this suit, section
3276(E) stated: "The licensee shall be required to have in effect general liability insurance of at least
one hundred thousand dollars with the state of Louisiana named as an additional insured and shall
provide to the board a certificate ofinsurance issued by the carrier." La.R.S. 37:3276(E) (1988 & Supp.
1994) (emphasis added).
56. 665 So. 2d 440 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995).
57. 680 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 692 So. 2d 371, and writ denied, 692 So.
2d 372 (1996).
58. La. R.S. 37:3270-3298 (1988 & Supp. 1999).
59. The second circuit suggested that the legislature, in enacting the Act dictated compulsory
insurance beyond an ordinary insurance contract. Hickey, 719 So. 2d at 422. The second circuit
erroneously ruled that "[a] liability insurer who writes the required coverage for a private security
company may not, by a policy provision, narrow the liability coverage reasonably contemplated and
required by the statute." Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 690 So. 2d 858. 863 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998).
60. La. R.S. 37:3270-3298 (1988 & Supp. 1999).
61. Hickey, 719 So. 2d at 423.
62. La. R.S. 37:3270-3298 (1988 & Supp. 1999).
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Revised Statutes 37: 3276(E).63 Thus, the security company and its guards were
"qualified" as described in the Act. The court found that the purpose and goal
behind the Act was to regulate and raise the standards of guards and to legitimize
and professionalize these agents. In essence, it was to "drive the crooks out of the
industry."" The court found that the requirement of general liability coverage is
"simply one aspect of the qualifying criteria required to obtain a license."'5
The court rejected plaintiff's arguments that the "extremely broad assault and
battery exclusion"'' would effectively remove from coverage almost every injury
for which a security company would be liable to a person whose injury was caused
solely or partially by the negligent or intentional fault of a guard.67 The policy
provided a wide array of coverages. 6s Hickey had contended that everything a
guard company does involves assault and battery. That allegation was simply
unfounded and not supported by any evidence before the court. Assault and battery
is but a limited part of the potential exposure of a guard company.
I. INSURANCE DOES NOT MEAN COVERAGE FOR EVERYTHING
The Hickey decision' explained that "general liability insurance" has never
been "intended to cover injuries arising from intentional acts."7 All policies
generally contain specific exclusions from coverage for injuries which are
intentionally inflicted upon the plaintiff. In fact, most assault and battery
endorsements exclude coverage for intentionally inflicted injuries regardless of
whether the insured was a participant." In short, insurers may preclude coverage
63. In the past, the legislature altered La. R.S. 37:3276(E) solely to raise and lower the dollar
figure of coverage. It has not tried to explain or define "general liability insurance." Even the Louisiana
State Board of Private Security has admitted that if the Hickey and Matthews decisions in the second
circuit ae upheld, no insurer would insure a security company thereby forcing them into a self-insured
fund, at best.
64. Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 719 So. 2d 421, 423 (La. 1998), quoting Commnnt,
Reality and Illusion: Defining Private Security Law in Ohio, 13 U. Tol. L Rev. 377,386 n.38 (1982).
The Supreme Court explained the state's exercise of its police power to clean up and legitimize the
private security industry. Similar enactments were adopted in other states and with regard to other
industries, such as private investigators.
65. Hickey, 719 So. 2d at 423.
66. Id. at 42 1. The High Court described the policy as containing an "extremely broad assault and
battery exclusion."
67. Id. as 422.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 421.
70. Id. at 423. Justice Johnson, in her solo dissent in Hickey, argued that the Private Security
Regulatory and licensing Law had a purpose and goal of assuring some recovery for persons injured
as a result of a legally liable security guard. She also suggested that assault and battery exclusions
somehow allow the guard and security company to "be completely shielded from liability." Id. at 426.
However, it seems clear that the Private Security Regulatory and licensing Law was not designed to
assure insurance recovery and, regardless of insurance coverage, the guard and his/her company do not





for all damages, notwithstanding who commits the intentional tort or assault and
battery, if the damages arose from the intentional conduct. The Ledbetter" court
noted that the exclusion dealt with "assault and battery" and therefore, "kidnaping,"
assuming injuries arose from that tort, could be covered, but any damages
connected to any assault and battery, including the rape, would not be covered.
In Hickey,7 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that assault and battery
exclusions are now "commonplace in policies issued to operators of bars,
restaurants-and similar businesses with a party atmosphere."' Indeed, Louisiana
courts have frequently and consistently interpreted and upheld summaryjudgments
based on assault and battery exclusions." Louisiana courts facing similar facts, as
in Hickey, have enforced assault and battery exclusions where the "assault and
battery" was rendered by a patron or third person unconnected with the insured.
In Cortinez v. Handford,"6 an unidentified patron at Jack's Lounge, in Bossier City,
attacked the plaintiff. The plaintiff was injured and sued various defendants
including the liability carrier of the club alleging negligence and other fault of the
club employees. The trial court dismissed the insurer, finding the assault and
battery exclusion in the policy precluded claims for damages arising from assault
and battery. This second circuit affirmed that ruling. The Cortinez panel stated:
The effect of the endorsement is clear: there is simply no coverage for the
insured's potential liability resulting from an occurrence of battery-
whether the battery is by an employee or representative of Ray's or
instead by a bar patron, whether or not the insured or any agent of the
insured is involved in the battery in any capacity, and irregardless of the
theory or theories of law that the tort claimant advances in a potential
action against Jefferson's insured. The language of the policy is
unambiguous, the intent of the contracting parties is clear: liability of the
insured for batteries at Ray's is not covered."
In Taylor v. Duplechain,"8 the plaintiff was injured in a bar fight with another
patron. Plaintiff sued the liability insurer of the lounge and other defendants.
Plaintiff alleged negligence of the bartender in taking action to cause the fight and
not taking appropriate actions to prevent or end the fight. As suggested above, the
trial court granted summary judgment and the third circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the insurer based upon the assault and battery exclusion. The third circuit
72. 665 So. 2d 1166,1170-71 (La. 1996).
73. 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998).
74. Id. at 422.
75. See generally Cortinez v. Handford, 490 So. 2d 626, 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (similar
facts as Hickey); Schexnayder v. Fed Ventures, 625 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993); Alvarado v.
Doe, 613 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Duplechain, 469 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985); Gonsalves v. Dixon. 487 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); Duplechain v. Turner, 444 So.
2d 1322 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), writ denied, 448 So. 2d 114 (La. 1984).
76. Cortinez v. Handford, 490 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 629 (quoting Taylor v. Duplechain, 469 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985)).
78. 469 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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reinforced its approval of Taylor,79 in Gaspard v. Jefferson Insurance Co. of New
York."e In Gaspard, one bar patron attacked and severely beat another patron. Suit
was filed against various defendants including the bar's liability carrier. The third
circuit ruled that Taylors' was dispositive. The assault and battery exclusion
excluded claims regardless of who committed the assault and battery. Plaintiff's
damages arose from the assault and battery.
Louisiana courts are in full accord that, "[E]ven if any negligence of the
organization [the insured] led up to the assault, the injuries plaintiff suffered
nevertheless arose out of an assault and battery. Therefore, there is no coverage
in this instance either.,
82
The Hickey court, like the others, found evidence proving that the armed
robber meant to fire his weapon at Hickey. The robber turned and repeatedly fired
his weapon at Hickey. It was no accident. The second circuit in Freeman v. Bell,"
noted that a "doorman's aggressive action in pulling a loaded pistol out of his
pocket supports a conclusion that he intended the result which was almost certain
to follow." There is no question that the armed robber intended to shoot Hickey."
In Hickey, the plaintiff argued that the "protection of public safety""U is a
prominent aspect of liability insurance in general.8 Insurance should protect
innocent accident victims. This does not mean that exclusions are not to be
enforced. Absent contractually provided coverage, which is excluded by clear
endorsement, there must be some illegality" of the exclusion in order to find
coverage. Plaintiff argued that the assault and battery exclusion violated the
generally-stated public policy espoused in the Private Security Regulatory and
Licensing Law. The intermediate appellate court in Hickey analogized to
automobile liability insurance policies and compulsory insurance laws mandating
coverage in various instances. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hickey found such
an attempt to analogize to be an "uphill battle" and, in this case, a "long leap."
The supreme court declined to make that leap and reversed.
79. d.
80. 488 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 352.
82. Kiefer v. Whitaker, 468 So. 2d 587. 588 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
83. 366 So. 2d 197, 199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
84. See aLso Vascocu v. Singletary. 434 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
85. La. R.S. 37:3270 (1988 & Supp. 1999); see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
86.' If the licensure is designed to protect our citizens then the Louisiana State Board of Private
Security Examiners has the obligation to review insurance policies and assure they meet the cunently
questioned criteria for "general liability insurance."
87. There must be some conflict with statutory law or clearly stated public policy. Absent a
conflict, parties are free to contract with each other and set forth the terms of their agreements. Insurers
are not to be treated differently from other individuals and may limit their liability and impose and
enforce reasonable conditions upon the obligations they assume by contract. Parties are free to contract
as long as the terms am not contrary to good morals, public policy or violative of some law. Lewis v.
Liberty Ind. life Ins. Co., 185 La. 589, 170 So. 4 (1936).
88. 719 So. 2d 421, 424-25 (La. 1998).
2001
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The court noted that when the statute asserted as the basis of a public policy
attack does not require a certain element of insurance coverage or prohibit a certain
exclusion, then the court must examine whether the insurance policy language at
issue is "in harmony" with the statute and its underlying goals and purposes. 9 The
purported conflict involved the broadly stated public policy of the Private Security
Regulatory and Licensing Law and the exclusion. The alleged conflict did not
involve the express language of the public policy of the Private Security Regulatory
and Licensing Law.' Attempting to use the broad, general public policy
statement9e ' in a licensing and regulatory enactment to support purported
compulsory coverage is impermissible.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to apply the analogy for two main
reasons: (1) neither Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:3276(E), nor the Louisiana
Insurance Code require any particular form of general liability insurance policy;
and (2) the public policy statement in the Act" neither requires a certain element
of coverage nor prohibits a certain exclusion. The real issue is "whether the
language of the policy is 'in harmony' with the enactment, requiring that the
enactment's underlying goals and purposes be ascertained." 4
The Louisiana Insurance Code merely defined liability insurance as "insurance
against the liability of the insured for the death, injury or disability of an employee
or other person, and insurance against the liability of the insured for damage to or
destruction of another person's property."95 The same code allows insurers to
"impose limitations on its liability in the form of exclusions."'6
The history behind the Private Security Regulatory and Licensing Law did not
indicate that the legislature intended certain coverages or to prohibit certain
exclusions. Further, the governing Board of Private Security routinely examined
and approved policies just like the one at issue. The Act placed the duty on the
security company to obtain insurance and the duties under the Private Security
Regulatory and licensing Law are all directed at the security company, not the
insurers.' The legislative purpose was to prevent the use of unlicensed and
untrained guards, who are more likely to commit offenses and injure citizens who
come into contact with them. Again, the legislative concern was not with requiring
unrestricted insurance but was with the risks created by unqualified guards acting
in an ignorant, irrational and illegal manner. The law is designed to promote
responsible conduct by those in the security field. The law created the Louisiana
89. Id. at 425 (quoting Lee Russ & Thomas Segali, 7 Couch Insurance 3d 1 101:18 (1997)).
90. Id.
91. That being the protection of public safety.
92. Hiclkey, 719 So. 2d at 425.
93. La. R.S. 37:3270 (1988 & Supp. 1999); see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
94. Hickey, 719 So. 2d at 925 (quoting Le R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 7 Couch on Insurance
3d §101:18(1997)).
95. La. R.S. 22:6(4) (1995).
96. La. R.S. 22:620 (1995). which reads "Any insurer may insert in its policies any provision or
conditions required by its plan of insurance or method of operation which am not prohibited by the
provisions of this Code." See Hickey, 719 So. 2d at 425.
97. Hickey. 719 So. 2d at 425.
[Vol. 60
DAVID A. SZWAK
State Board of Private Security Examiners as a state agency to oversee, administer
and enforce the law. The board was given powers and duties to examine and test
applicants, adopt rules, issue, suspend, modify and revoke licenses, and report on
its findings for administrative or enforcement purposes."
IV. CONCLUSION
The enforcement of assault and battery exclusions allows insurers to better
gauge the risks they are willing to accept and contract for. Attempts to use broad
public policy provisions in statutory enactments, whether designed for insurance
licensing, regulation or other control, should not become the bases for policy
attacks in favor of coverage of the insurers. The Louisiana Supreme Court has now
provided guidance for other states choosing to enforce the rights of insurers to
contract and to deny attempts to distort policy and statutory language. Insurance
is not a lottery for all who seek to cash in.
98. La. R.S. 37:3274 (1988).
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